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282 Md. 413, 384 A.2d 742 (1978). In
Feissner, liability of the employer and its
insurer was simultaneously discharged under a statutory offset provision when the
claimant received superior benefits from a
government pension plan. This discharge
occurred before the attorney had filed a fee
petition. However, in the case herein as
well as in Hoffman, the appellee's liability
was not discharged. The attorney's lien
"subsequently did attach to a portion
thereof, obligating the appellees to pay
claimant's attorney." Id. at 53, 517 A.2d
at 354.
The court in Staley has clarified any ambiguity that may have existed concerning
the procedures to follow for attorney fees
stemming from workers' compensation
cases. It is clear that the court here has
rightfully placed the interests of the compensation claimant ahead of governmental
bureaucracy.
- Christopher Hale

Dade County School Board v. Polite:
FLORIDA ACCEPTS THE
PREMISES EXCEPTION TO THE
GOING AND COMING RULE FOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BENEFITS.
In Dade County School Board v. Polite,
495 So.2d 795 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 1986), the
District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed the Deputy Commissioner's determination that a teacher's injuries were
compensable in that they arose out of and
in the course of employment. The District
Court of Appeal of Florida also held that
the teacher was not precluded from receiving benefits by the rule that an employee
going and coming from work is normally
considered outside the scope of his employment, thereby recognizing the premises
exception.
In Dade County, a physical education
teacher, Ms. Cheryl Polite, was injured
when her automobile was struck by a hitand-run driver after she had left a track
meet. At the time of the accident she was
returning the track equipment to the school
from which she had borrowed it. Polite
was employed by the Dade County School
Board as a physical education teacher.
Polite taught at North Glade Elementary
School in the morning and at Lake Stevens
Elementary School in the afternoon, five
days a week. Although her workday officially ended at 3:05 p.m. daily, Polite participated in after-school activities which
were officially encouraged and reflected in
a positive fashion on teacher evaluations.
Throughout Polite's employment she had

consistently participated in extracurricular activities with which the Dade County
School Board had knowledge of and given
its approval.
On the day of the accident, a track meet
involving students from Polite's morning
school, North Glade, was held at Skylake
Elementary School in the afternoon. Polite
was to teach physical education at Lake
Stevens Elementary School that afternoon,
but, on this day the Lake Stevens' students
were released from school at 1:45 p.m.
Nevetheless, Polite was required to remain
until 3:05 p.m. Polite then requested and
was granted permission to leave Lake
Stevens earlier than 3:05 p.m. Before leaving Polite collected some of Lake Stevens'
track equipment which she knew might be
needed at the track meet. Because she felt
that the equipment might be needed the following day by Lake Stevens' instructors,
Polite intended to return the equipment
immediately following the track meet.
Ms. Polite went to the track meet and assisted at the starting line. She left Skylake
before 4:00 p.m. traveling the only road
leading away from the school en route to
Lake Stevens to return the track equipment. While on the road, Polite's automobile was struck in the rear by a hit-andrun driver, causing injury to her back, foot,
right knee and right hand.
Appellants Dade County School District
and their insurer, Gallagher Bassett Insurance Service, argued that Polite's claims
for medical expenses should be denied because of the "going and coming rule." In
the alternative, the appellants argued that
Polite's injuries were not compensable because attendance at the meet was not in the
course of her employment because there

was no requirement that she attend. The
Deputy Commissioner in determining that
the injuries were compensable held that
the "after hours teacher participation was
expected and considered in performance
evaluations." 495 So.2d at 797. The Deputy Commissioner further held that Ms.
Polite was not precluded from benefits by
the going and coming rule because she
was not traveling to her home, but was
en route back to Lake Stevens to return the
track equipment. Therefore, the commissioner determined that the injuries arose
out of and in the course of Polite's employment, thereby allowing the medical benefits sought and not precluding them by the
going and coming rule. Id. at 797.
The District Court of Appeal of Florida,
in affirming the Deputy Commissioner's
determinations, stated that the encouragement and reward by way of positive performance teacher evaluations was "competent" and "substantial evidence" to show
Polite was in the course of her employment. Id. at 797. Further support for the
court's holding was found in the fact that
Polite "did not merely elect to attend" the
after school activity since the activity was
related to her field of expertise. The court
also found other evidence from which it
could have been reasonably inferred that
"Polite arrived and assisted at the meet at
least partially during her regular working
hours, since she sought and obtained official permission to leave her afternoon assignment early in order to attend." Id.
In affirming the commissioner's decision
that medical benefits are not precluded by
the "going and coming rule," the court first
stated the general proposition expounded
in Stacy v. Cherry Farms, Inc., 449 So.2d
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393 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) that an employee
going and coming from work is outside
the scope of his employment. However,
the District Court of Appeal of Florida
looked to Sweat v. Allen, 200 So. 348, 350
(Fla. 1941) in stating that the "applicability of the rule depends upon the circumstance of the particular employment." The
court agreed with the commissioner's decision and found that Polite was not "offduty away from the employer's premises."
Id. Further, the court stated that "compensability is almost always awarded when the
injury occurs while the employee is traveling along a public road between two portionsof the employer's premises", citing
Larson on Worker's Compensation Law
§ 15-14(a) (1985). The court's essential
reasoning for finding an exception to the
going and coming rule was grounded in
the fact that Ms. Polite's duties required
her to be in two different locations within
the Dade County school system, and the
travel between the two different workplaces "was an essential part of her employment.'~ Id.
The District Court of Appeal of Florida
examined this case in two steps. First, an
examination of the compensability of the
injury found that the encouragement of
participating in after school activities,
coupled with the official permission and
knowledge of such participation by the
Dade County School System was substantial and competent evidence that the injury
arose out of and in the course of Polite's
employment. Second, the findings that
Polite was not "off-duty" at the time of the
accident, and that she was traveling the
only road available allowed the court to accept the Larson premises exception to the
"going and coming rule." The importance
of this Florida court's opinion is its recognition of the premises exception which
is present and accepted in a similar form in
Maryland.

- Robert L. Kline, III
Crawley v. General Motors:
DISPENSING WITH DISABILITY
IN OCCUPATIONAL DEAFNESS
CLAIMS
In Crawley v. General Motors, 70 Md.
App. 100,519 A.2d 1348 (1987) the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland interpreted Md. Ann. Code art. 101, § 25A
(1985) to mean that a claimant's eligibility
to receive benefits under workers' compensation for occupational deafness is to
be determined without regard to the employee's loss of wages or his ability to perform his regular type of work. Prior to this
interpretation of § 25A, an employee who
26- The Law Forum/Winter, 1987

suffered from a hearing impairment as a
result of industrial noise had to demonstrate a loss of wages or an incapacity to
perform his regular work before being eligible for workers' compensation. By dispensing with this disability requirement,
the court of special appeals has increased
the number of claimants who are entitled
to benefits for occupational deafness. Now,
a claimant has to suffer only a compensable
amount of hearing loss before being eligible
for workers' compensation.
For over twenty years, Douglas Crawley,
Sr. had been exposed to industrial noise in
the assembly division of General Motors
where he worked. Alleging that he sustained a hearing loss as a result of his continued exposure to the industrial noise at
General Motors, Crawley filed a claim
with the Workers' Compensation Commission. The Commission determined that
Crawley had sustained a compensable degree of hearing loss resulting from his employment and awarded him benefits.
General Motors appealed to the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City, arguing that a
"disablement" was necessary before an employee could be compensated for occupational deafness. Crawley stipulated that he
had not suffered any "disablement." Relying on Belschner v. Anchor Post Prods.,
Inc., 227 Md. 89,175 A.2d419 (1961), the
circuit court judge reversed the commission's order of award.
The claimant in Belschner had been employed as a saw operator for twelve years
and as a result of this employment, suffered a compensable amount of hearing
loss. The claimant, however, was still performing his duties as a saw operator and
did not lose any wages. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the Workers'
Compensation Commission's rejection of
the claim and held that worker's compensation for an employee's loss of hearing
was limited by the language of § 22(a):
Where an employee of an employer
subject to this article suffers from an
occupational disease, and is thereby disabled from performing his work in the
last occupation in which he was injuriously exposed to the hazards of such
disease, and the disease was due to the
nature of the occupation ... the employee ... shall be entitled to compensation ... .
Md. Ann. Code art. 101, § 22(a) (1985)
(emphasis added).
The court of appeals in Belschner also
analyzed the definitions of "occupational
disease" and "disablement" in reaching its
conclusion. Section 67(13) defines "occupational disease" as "the event of an employee's becoming actually incapacitated,

either temporarily, partially or totally, because of a disease contracted as the result
of and in the course of employment." Section 67(15) defines "disablement" as "the
event of an employee's becoming actually
incapacitated, either partly or totally."
Citing Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v.
Coody, 278 S.W. 856 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926), the court therein held that an employee is not actually incapacitated within
the intent of the law if the employee has
the capacity to continue his regular employment and receives his usual rate of
pay. Although Belschner held that disablement was a prerequisite for worker's compensation for occupational deafness, the
court therein stated, "If there is a need to
liberalize the law or to change what we
think it plainly means, that is a legislative,
not a judicial function." Belschner, 227
Md. at 95, 175 A.2d at 422.
In 1967, six years after the Belschner decision, the Maryland General Assembly
enacted art. 101, § 25A entitled "Occupational deafness." The court of special
appeals in Crawley was confronted with
interpreting this section to resolve the dispute. Crawley contended that the legislature in enacting § 25A was responding to
the Belschner court's invitation to change
the law. General Motors, on the other
hand, contended that the legislature intended the disability requirement of§ 22(a)
to apply, viewing § 25A as merely establishing highly technical criteria for measuring occupational deafness.
The court of special appeals began its
inquiry of the legislative intent by examining § 25A itself. "Although the language of
section 25A does not specifically state
whether the General Assembly intended to
eliminate disablement as a precondition of
recovery for occupational deafness. Nevertheless, section 25A(a) reads 'Occupational
deafness shall be compensated according
to the terms and conditions of this section.'" Crawley, 70 Md. App. at 106, 519
A.2d at 1351 (emphasis in original). Concluding that the language of the section is
ambiguous and not clearly revealing the
legislative intent, the court examined the
legislative history of the section.
After examining the legislative history
of § 25A, the court concluded that the legislature not only intended to provide technical criteria for measuring loss of hearing
but also intended to make occupational
deafness compensable regardless of an employee's inability to work or loss of wages.
In reaching such a conclusion, the court
found the language of§ 25A(c) significant.
"By providing that a hearing loss of 15
decibels or less shall not constitute a compensable disability, the language employed
by the Legislature implies that a hearing

